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Abstract
When innovations are both sequential and complementary as in the software or
the semi-conductor industries, James Bessen and Eric Maskin (2002) argue that
patents are likely to reduce firms’ incentives to innovate as compared to a regime
with no protection. We develop a model close to that of Bessen and Maskin except
that we endogenize the probability of success of each innovation (firms choose their
R&D investments, reflecting the incentives to innovate and determining the success
probability of an R&D program) and introduce an explicit model of a copyright.
Our main results contradict Bessen and Maskin: individual and aggregate R&D
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investments are higher under a patent regime or a copyright regime than with no
protection. And the socially optimal R&D investment is always higher than the
aggregate investment provided in a regime with no protection.
JEL Classification numbers: O31, O32, O34.
Keywords: patents, copyright, cumulative innovations.
1 Introduction
During the last twenty years, there has been a trend in the United States toward a
strengthening of the patent system. Recent papers by Jaﬀe (1999), Gallini (2002) or
Lerner (2003) acknowledge this evolution. Amongst the diﬀerent pieces of evidence
reflecting this reinforcement, the ”expansion of the realm of patentability”1 has been
emphasized by many: there are now patents for gene sequences, financial formulas and
computer sofwares, for example. Economists warned against the possible side-eﬀects of
this development. James Bessen and Eric Maskin (2002) (denoted BM in the remaining
of this paper) contribute to the criticisms by arguing that in industries where innova-
tions are cumulative and complementary, patents might be an impediment to innovation
rather than an ”engine” as they are traditionnally perceived. Innovations are cumulative
when each innovation builds on the previous one. They are complementary in the sense
of BM2 because each firm takes a possibly diﬀerent research path, which increases the
overall probability that at least one firm will come up with the innovation. A patent
on one innovation confers its holder a ”hold-up” right over subsequent innovations, if
performing the latters requires the right to use the former. Assuming no licensing or
1Jaﬀe (1999).
2”complementarity” deserves two types of definition. For BM: ”by complementary, we mean that each
potential innovator takes a diﬀerent research line and thereby enhances the overall probability that a
particular goal is reached within a given time”. More commonly, innovations x and y are complementary
when the production of x requires y and vice-versa. For example, if y is patented by another firm, the
later can hold-up the manufacturer of x.Note that this definition also fits, to some extent, the problem
pointed out by BM. Standard references (both theoretical and empirical) for this issue are Heller and
Eisenberg (1998), Hall and Ham (1999), Shapiro (2001)or Lerner and Tirole (2002).
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imperfect licensing as BM, only the patentholder will have the possibility (the right) to
engage in R&D for further innovations. This can restrict the number of firms performing
research and the aggregate R&D investment is constrained. Were a patent absent, each
innovation could be imitated legally and used for next researches. The (static) disin-
centives associated with the loss of the patent for a successful firm could be more than
compensated by the (dynamic) gains associated with the prospects of being always in
the race, being allowed to imitate a winner, and being able to become an innovator.
BM´s analysis falls into two parts: they first propose a theoretical model that supports
this view, in which they stress the merit of an IP regime with no legal protection as
compared to a regime with patents. Then, they conduct an empirical investigation of the
transition from an IP regime with copyrights towards a regime with more patents in the
US software industry during the late 1980’s. They show, in particular, that this trend3
has generated a decrease of R&D investment at the firm level.
Though BM have had an important influence in terms of policy making, we argue that
their theoretical analysis has at least two flaws that lead to a bias in their conclusions.
First, they take the absence of intellectual property (IP) protection as a ”proxy” for
copyright protection, since a copyright protects less against imitation than a patent. We
argue that ”no protection” and ”copyright” can be analyzed as two diﬀerent regimes of
IP protection.Thus, we explicitely introduce a stylized model of IP rights where patents,
copyright and the absence of protection can be distinguished. Second, BM’s theoretical
model focus on a firm as a decision maker subject to a binary decision problem: given
that another firm already performs R&D, given an exogenous R&D cost and an exoge-
nous probability of success, a second firm has to decide whether or not to also perform
R&D. We endogenize the probability of success of an R&D program: firms choose non-
cooperatively their R&D investment in each of the three IP regimes considered and that
determine their probability of success.
When innovations are cumulative, we reach in particular three important conclusions:
3This transition came from a series of Court decisions that extended patent protection to software
ideas. In the case Diamond v. Diehr (1981), the US Supreme Court recognized the patentability of
softwares in their function to control an industrial process.
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per-period individual R&D investments (at the firm level) are always strictly higher under
a patent regime than in a regime without protection. The expected aggregate R&D
investment is always strictly higher under a patent regime than in a regime without
protection if the firms are symmetric in R&D eﬃciency. The socially optimal expected
R&D investment is always strictly higher than the expected aggregate investment in a
regime with no protection. These three results contradict BM. Besides, we show that
if the firms are asymmetric, and if the most eﬃcient firm obtains a patent on the first
innovation, then the expected aggregate R&D investment in subsequent periods is higher
in this patent regime than in a regime with no protection.
The literature on cumulative innovations has grown extensively in the last decade
(O’Donoghue (1998) and O´Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) are two examples).
Yet, we depart from these models and deliberately remain as close as possible to the model
of BM, except for the two modifications previously noted: this allows us to test more
accurately the robustness of their analysis. We nevertheless contribute to the literature
on IP protection and cumulative innovations by introducing the copyright as a distinct
form of protection.
Section 2 presents the main assumptions of our model. Section 3 develops a static
model of R&D competition under three IP regimes (patent, copyright andno protection).
Section 4 develops the dynamic situation and our main conclusions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Assumptions of the Model
We consider two firms (players) performing R&D. They diﬀer from each other with
respect to their cost of R&D, so that firm 1 is more eﬃcient (has a lower marginal cost)
than firm 2. Formally, the cost function is given by c(xi) = αixi for i = 1, 2 and α1 = 1 ,
α2 = α > 1 where xi is the level of R&D chosen by firm i. This specification allows us to
deal with the symmetric situation when necessary (α = 1).The probability of success of
an R&D program depends on the level of investment and is given by p(xi) = 1−e−xi .This
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functional form4 is such that ∂p(xi)
∂xi
> 0 and ∂
2p(xi)
∂x2i
< 0.
For each player, there is a payoﬀ associated with the outcomes of the game (one
winner and one looser, two winners or two loosers) and depending on the IP regime that
prevails. In the game played in one period, we assume that the value of the innovation
for the society is v. This is also the maximal payoﬀ that a successful player can obtain.
Our definition of each IP regimes (with patents, with copyrights and without protection)
is mainly based on the appropriability of the value v by each player.
In an IP regime with patents, we assume that the patent is suﬃciently broad to
preclude from any imitation in a given period. In other words, the scope5 of the patent
is always maximal. In the static case, if only one firm makes the invention, it gets v
with probability one. If both succeed, each firm gets the patent with probability 1
2
(coin
flipping assumption).
Copyright is modeled as a less stringent form of protection. This is consistent with
the respective features of a patent and a copyright: A copyright protects the expression,
not the idea, whereas a patent protects both. To make that distinction clear, a copyright
protects a product (or a process) per se but allows for a competitive product based on
the same idea provided the expression of the idea diﬀers even slightly from the original
product. For example, one could think of two varieties of the same good6. In order to
emphasize the diﬀerence between a copyright and a patent, we assume that the patent
has a maximal scope (imitation is never legal and never occurs) and that the copyright
is only a limited protection against imitation. We formalize copyright protection in a
4See Kultti (2003) for a justification of this form in the case of R&D.
5A patent confers its owner protection (through the form of a temporary monopoly power) against
imitators (backward protection) and against future innovators (forward protection). See O’Donoghue
(1998), Denicolo (2000) as well as Merges and Nelson (1990) and Jaﬀe (1999). In this paper, by ”scope”
we refer to ”backward protection”. Section 4 addresses only partially the issue of forward protection. As
will be seen, following BM, a forward innovation is incremental and does not threatens the profit from
a previous innovation.
6This is suggested by Waterson (1990). A more structured model of copyright protection should
include several varieties of the same good in a general equilibrium framework.
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stylized way: if two players succeed they get a duopoly profit v
2
7. However, if only one
player succeeds (the winner), his payoﬀ is given by
πw(θ) =
1
2
(1 + θ)v (1)
with 0 < θ ≤ 1 , whereas the payoﬀ of the looser is
πl(θ) =
1
2
(1− θ)v (2)
These forms come from the fact that a copyright allows for imitation provided the im-
itation is not an exact copy of this invention (hence the condition 0 < θ). From the
comparison of (1)and (2), given that 0 < θ ≤ 1,it is clear that the innovator has always
a larger payoﬀ than the imitator:
πw(θ) > πl(θ) (3)
This is a rather strong assumption since an imitator could come up with a version (or
a variety) that consumers prefer and reap more profit than the original inventor. Yet, it is
also sensible to assume that the original inventor posseses an advantage over the imitator:
one could think of the original product as a higher-quality variety than the imitation
which could justify the R&D race. In this paper, we stick to this assumption8. Notice
also that πw(θ) > v
2
> πl(θ) : in a regime with copyright, the winner is better oﬀ than
in a regime with no protection (that is when θ = 0), but the looser is worse-oﬀ. Finally,
∂πw(θ)
∂θ
> 0 and ∂π
l(θ)
∂θ
< 0 : the winner is better-oﬀ when the imitation under copyright
becomes less profitable, that is when θ increases, whereas the looser becomes worse-oﬀ.
Parameter θ is clearly taken as an exogenous measure of the ”scope”of the copyright
7This is also assumed as the distinctive feature of copyright protection, for example, in the general
equilibrium framework of Kultti and Takalo (2000). Yet, the way we introduce the copyright regime
diﬀers from this model: They assume that the main diﬀerence between a copyright and a patent regime
comes from the number n of the independent identical innovations allowed to receive protection ( n = 1
in a patent regime and n > 1 in a copyright regime), for the same scope of protection. Here, we claim
that the regimes diﬀer first and foremost in terms of the scope of protection and that, besides, a copyright
regime allows for simultaneous identical independent innovations.
8This is also a feature of the patent model from Klemperer (1990): imitators come up with product
varieties with a lower quality than the variety of the innovator.
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protection. Note that the ”scope” of a copyright has not exactly the same definition as
the ”scope” of a patent. The ”patent scope” is usually defined by the characteristics
of a product that cannot be infringed upon. This ”protected area” is controled both
by the decisions of the Patent Oﬃce and, in case of litigation, by the decisions and the
doctrines of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). Thus, the scope of
a patent is submitted to a large extent to discretion. In the case of copyright, the only
prohibited action is the pure copy which is easily identified and punished9. An imitation
is legally accepted whenever it is not the reproduction of the original expression and
thus the ”scope”, from a legal view point, is almost zero10. Nevertheless, it makes sense
to speak of θ as a scope parameter provided it is perceived as the exogenously given,
industry-specific, cost of imitation. The higher this cost (the higher θ), the higher the
payoﬀ of the winner. It is sensible to assume that θ varies accross industries protected by
copyrights: it is perhaps easier to come up with another version of an original book than
to produce a new version of a software program designed to compete with the original
one.
Finally, the crucial distinctive feature of the copyright, in relation to having a lower
scope than a patent, is that it prevents from any ”hold-up” by its holder. This is sup-
ported by the recent ”jurisprudence” in the United States. In the famous case between
Apple Computer versus Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard, a ruling was made in favor of
the latters against Apple who argued that Microsoft Window´s program and HP´s New
Wave software had ”copied the ”look and feel” of Macintosh’s graphic-based operating
system”11. The Court clearly favored a strict interpretation of the copyright whereby the
”idea” of a particular expression can be used for developing a diﬀerent expression (another
software in this case). Note however that this example contrasts with the trend observed
9Of course, this assumes that the copyright holder can identify and can engage in costly litigation.
See Crampes and Langinier (2002) for a nice model of patent monitoring.
10See below (case Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International Inc.) for a justification of this
idea.
11This illustration is taken straight from the example provided, in another context, by Jay Pil Choi
(1998), ”Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism”, American Economic Review,
vol. 5, pp 1249-1263.
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in the 80’s that strengthened copyright protection for softwares12. A similar judgment by
the US Supreme Court was pronounced in the case Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International Inc., 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 495 (Jan.16, 1996): The Court let stand a
judgment by the CAFC that denied infringement by Borland’s spreadsheet program of
the Lotus 1-2-3 program. Lotus claimed that the (acknowledged) introduction of Lotus´
menus command hierarchy in Borland’s program was illegal. However, the CAFC stated
against Lotus by refering to the rule governing copyright protection under title17 of the
U.S.Code, Section 102(b):”[I]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated or embodied in such work” This is remarkably explained by Bunker (2002),
who concludes: ”(...) it seems clear that broad protection for software under the laws
of copyright is dead. (...) copyright protects against copying (...) [but] provides no
protection against independent creation. (...)[on the contrary], since a patent can pro-
tect an idea or a concept, the patent claims can be written in broad terms to cover the
novel combination of elements”. This evolution in the US jurisprudence enables us to
state that, under a copyright regime, the idea of an innovation can be used to develop
further innovations so that there is no hold-up problem (this feature being essential in
our dynamic model).
Definition 1 An IP regime with copyright is characterized by payoﬀs 1
2
v < πw(θ) ≤ v
for the winner and 0 ≤ πl(θ) < 1
2
v for the looser with θ ∈ (0, 1] capturing the scope of
the copyright in the case where only one firm innovates, and a payoﬀ v
2
when both firms
innovate.
12It is important to distinguish two phenomena: first, the extent of the patent protection to softwares
(initiated by Diamond v. Diehr (1981), it has not been extented to all types of softwares) and the
evolution of the copyright protection for softwares which shows two trends: In the 1980’s, an extension
of this protection (strong protection against imitation) and in the1990’s a comeback to a strict application
of the copyright law (weak protection against imitation). We base our definition of the copyright regime
on this last trend.
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Figure 1: Payoﬀs of the winner and the looser of the R&D game under a copyright
regime
Finally, a regime without intellectual property protection allows for legal copy
of the innovation. To be consistent with our assumptions, we formally model this regime
by assuming θ = 0 in the functions πl(θ) and πw(θ). Thus, in this regime, provided at
least one player succeeds, the payoﬀ for each of them is v
2
13.
3 The Static Model
We call ”static model” the situation where, in only one period, firms non-cooperatively
choose their R&D investments xli , i = 1, 2 and l = c, p, n where c denotes the copyright
regime, p denotes the patent regime and n the regime with no protection. The set of
feasible actions xli is thus [0,+∞). Our static model possesses an ”equivalence property”
between the IP regimes that does not hold anymore in the dynamic model. Indeed, it will
be shown that an IP regime with copyright and θ = 1 is formally equivalent to a patent
regime whereas a regime with copyright and θ = 0 is formally equivalent to a regime with
no protection14. In the dynamic model, this property does not hold because of the ”hold-
up” problem that potentially restricts the number of firms allowed to perform R&D after
13Like in BM. This is a drastic assumption yet.
14We stress that this equivalence is only formal : a copyright with θ = 0 would mean that pure copying
is allowed. But that would contradict the very definition of copyright protection.
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the first period. Because of the equivalence property, we start with the analysis of the
copyright regime and we derive the main results under a patent regime and a regime with
no protection as limit cases of the copyright regime. In order to emphasize the diﬀerence
between the regimes, we assume in this section that the copyright regime is defined for
0 < θ < 1.To guarantee the existence of interior solutions, we assume throughout this
section that v > 2α.
3.1 IP regime with copyrights
Denoting V ci the objective function of player i in a regime with copyrights:
V ci = −αixci + p(xci)
n
p(xcj)
v
2
+ (1− p(xcj))πw(θ)
o
+ (1− p(xci))p(xcj)πl(θ) (4)
where xcidenotes the R&D investment of player i in the static model and α1 = 1 ,
α2 > 1. πl(θ) and πw(θ) are given by (1) and (2).
The first term on the right-hand side is the level of R&D expenditures (the cost of
the program). The second term captures the expected payoﬀ of player i if she succeeds:
either player j also succeeds in which case each earns the duopoly profit, or player j fails
but can imitate and, according to (1), player i will get πw(θ). The last term captures
the expected payoﬀ of player i if she fails: if player j has made the innovation, she has
a possibility to imitate and according to (2), to earn πl(θ).
The objective of player i is defined as:
Max
xci
V ci (5)
Lemma 1 In an IP regime with copyright, in the static model, the equilibrium R&D
investments are implicitely defined by the best-response functions:
xc1 = ln v − ln 2 + ln(θ + e−x
c
2) (6)
xc2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(θ + e−x
c
1) (7)
and the eﬃcient firm (firm 1) invests strictly more than the ineﬃcient one.
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Proof. Substituting for p(x1) and p(x2) and using α1 = 1, α2 = α,the first-order
conditions15 associated with the program (5) are given by:
e−x
c
1(θ + e−x
c
2) =
2
v
(8)
e−x
c
2(θ + e−x
c
1) =
2α
v
(9)
developing and using the logarithm yields (6)and (7).
To prove the second part of the lemma, substract the two FOC above. It yields:
e−x
c
1 − e−xc2 = 2
θv
(1− α) (10)
The right-hand side is strictly negative since α > 1.It follows that xc1 > x
c
2.
We look for a Nash equilibrium in R&D investments. It appears that we cannot derive
closed-form solutions for an equilibrium. Yet, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In an IP regime with copyright, the static non-cooperative R&D game has a
unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments (xc,NE1 ;x
c,NE
2 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2 IP regime with patents
Denoting V pi the objective function of player i when a patent is available:
V pi = −αix
p
i + p(x
p
i )
·
p(xpj)
1
2
v + (1− p(xpj))v
¸
(11)
15The second order condition is given by ∂
2V ci
∂xc2i
= −e−xci v2 (1+ θe
−xcj )+ e−x
c
i v
2 (1− θ+ e
−xcj (θ− 1)) ≤ 0
The sign comes from the fact that 1− θ+ e−x
c
j (θ− 1) is negative. Assume the contrary, then it must
be that e−x
c
j > 1 which is impossible for all xcj ∈ [0,+∞).
11
where xpi denotes the level of R&D investment of player i in the static model and
α1 = 1, α2 = α > 1.
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of R&D. There are several possible
outcomes: if player i does not succeed, because of the patent protection, she cannot
imitate and her payoﬀ is 0 . But if she succeeds (second term on the right-hand side),
either player j has also succeeded in which case player i gets the patent with probability
1
2
, or player j has failed and player i gets the monopoly payoﬀ, prize v.
It is clear that V pi = V
c
i (θ) with θ = 1. To see that, substitute θ = 1 in the expression
of πw(θ) and πl(θ) in the objective function V ci .The intuition of this formal equivalence
is straightforward: in the static model, the only diﬀerence between the three regimes
considered comes from their relative strengency in terms of the scope of protection. We
have extensively justified this assumption in section 2. We assumed that in a patent
regime, the patent holder always get a patent with maximal scope which prevents the
looser from any type of imitation. Hence the payoﬀ of the looser must be zero whereas
the payoﬀ of the winner must be maximum: v. But this is precisely what is obtained from
πw(θ) and πl(θ) when θ = 1. Now, consider what happens if the two firms are successful.
In the patent regime, we assumed that each firm gets v with the probability 1
2
so that
the expected payoﬀ associated with this outcome is v
2
. But in the copyright regime, we
assumed a right for independent innovators so that in the case of two successful firms,
each receive v
2
.Clearly, the expected payoﬀ associated with this outcome is the same in
both regimes.
We can use this equivalence property to derive the best-response functions of the
players under a patent regime from the ones obtained in the copyright regime16.
Lemma 3 In an IP regime with patent, in the static model, the equilibrium R&D invest-
16Alternatively, one could have solved the program of player i in this regime: Max
xpi
V pi and obtained
conditions (12) and (13).
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ments are implicitely defined by the best-response functions:
xp1 = ln v − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−x
p
2) (12)
xp2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(1 + e−x
p
1) (13)
and the eﬃcient firm invests strictly more than the ineﬃcient one.
Proof. Substitute θ = 1 in the best-response functions (6) and (7) to obtain (12)
and (13).
To prove the second part of the lemma, note that the two best-response functions can
be re-expressed as: 


e−x
p
1(1 + e−x
p
2) = 2
v
e−x
p
2(1 + e−x
p
1) = 2α
v
(14)
Substracting these two equalities yields:
e−x
p
1 − e−x
p
2 =
2(1− α)
v
(15)
Then, since α > 1 by assumption, it follows that
e−x
p
1 < e−x
p
2 (16)
from which we can conclude
xp1 > x
p
2
Again, looking for a Nash equilibrium in R&D investments, we cannot derive closed-
form solutions. However, we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 4 In an IP regime with patents, the static non-cooperative R&D game has a
unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments (xp,NE1 ;x
p,NE
2 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3.3 IP regime without protection
Denoting V ni the objective function of player i in a regime with no protection,
V ni = −αixni +
£
1− (1− p(xni ))(1− p(xnj ))
¤ v
2
(17)
where xni denotes the R&D investment of player i and α1 = 1, α2 = α > 1.
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of R&D for player i. The second
term represents the expected payoﬀ of player i if she succeeds: in that case, the outcome
concerning player j´s R&D is irrelevant: if player j succeeds, then there is de facto a
duopoly and each earn v
2
and if player j does not succeed, she can still imitate, so that
the payoﬀ of each player is also v
2
.However, and for the same reason, if player i fails and
player j succeeds, player i can imitate and the payoﬀs are v
2
for both players, hence the
last term.
It is clear that V ni = V
c
i (θ) with θ = 0. To see that, substitute θ = 0 in the expressions
πw(θ) and πl(θ) in the objective function V ci . As for the patent case, the intuition for this
formal equivalence is straightforward. If there is no protection at all, a looser of the R&D
race can imitate freely the innovation so that the two players have the same product and
earn v
2
acccording to our assumptions. But these are precisely the payoﬀs given by πw(0)
and πl(0).
Here also, we can use this equivalence property to derive the best-response functions of
each player in the regime with no protection from the functions obtained in the copyright
regime17.
Lemma 5 In a regime without protection, in the static model, the equilibrium R&D
investments are implicitely defined by the best-response functions:
xn1 = ln v − ln 2− xn2 (18)
xn2 = ln v − ln 2α− xn1 (19)
17Alternatively, one could have solved the program of player i in this regime: Max
xni
V ni and obtained
the best-response functions (18) and (19).
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Proof. To obtain xn1(x
n
2) and x
n
2(x
n
1) , simply substitute for θ = 0 in (6) and (7).
Lemma 6 In a regime with no IP right, the non-cooperative R&D game has a unique
Nash equilibrium in R&D investments where xn,NE1 = ln v − ln 2 and x
n,NE
2 = 0.
Proof. Note that the two conditions (18) and (19) cannot hold together. There
are two possible equilibria: xn1 > 0 and x
n
2 = 0 or x
n
1 = 0 and x
n
2 > 0.Consider the first
possibility. xn1(0) = ln v−ln 2. And xn2(ln v−ln 2) = − lnα < 0. But a negative investment
is not feasible, so it must be that xn2 = 0. So {xn1 = ln v − ln 2;xn2 = 0} is an equilibrium.
Consider the second possibility. xn2(0) = ln v − ln 2α and xn1(ln v − ln 2α) = lnα > 0. So
{xn1 = 0;xn2 > 0} is not an equilibrium.
3.4 The Socially optimal R&D investment
From the society´s point of view18, what matters is that at least one firm makes the
invention so that society gets v.
Denoting Vs the objective function of the social planner:
Vs = −
2P
i=1
αix
s
i + [1− (1− p(xs1))(1− p(xs2))] v (20)
The first term on the right-hand side is the total (industry-wide) cost of R&D. The
second term is the probability that at least one player succeeds times the prize v.
The objective of the social planner is defined as:
Max
xs1,x
s
2
Vs (21)
18It is interesting to note that, for small open economies with a consumers’demand mainly abroad, the
sum of the utilities of each firm can be a relevant proxy for the measure of the social (national) welfare:
the number of national consumers can be neglected and the total (national) surplus is thus approximated
by the industry surplus.
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Lemma 7 Social surplus is maximized when only the most eﬃcient firm invests a positive
amount in R&D:
xs,∗ = xs1 = ln v (22)
Proof. Solving the program (21) yields the two first-order conditions:
xs1 = ln v + ln e
−xs2 (23)
xs2 = ln v − lnα+ ln e−x
s
1 (24)
These two conditions cannot hold together. Thus in equilibrium it must be that:
xsi > 0 and x
s
j = 0 for i 6= j.
If xs1 = 0 , then x
s
2 = ln v − lnα. Substituting for these values in Vs yields:
V 2s = α lnα− α ln v + v − α (25)
If xs2 = 0, then x
s
1 = ln v. Substituting fot these values in Vs yields:
V 1s = − ln v + v − 1 (26)
Showing that V 1s > V
2
s is equivalent to show that, for α > 1:
α ln v + α− ln v − 1− α lnα = Ψ(α) > 0 (27)
But lim
α7→1+
Ψ(α) = 0 and, remembering the condition for interior solutions, v > 2α, we
have:
∂Ψ(α)
∂α
= ln v + 1− lnα− 1 = ln( v
α
) > 0. (28)
It follows that for α > 1, V 1s > V
2
s .
3.5 Comparison
We have proved the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments in each
of the three IP regimes considered and we have derived the socially optimal investment.
Even if we do not have a closed-form solution for the Nash equilibria,we can still compare
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the R&D investments (both at the firm and at the aggregate levels) between each regime
and with the social optimum, from our results regarding the best-response functions.
Lemma 8 states important properties of the upper and lower bounds of the best-response
functions that will help to conduct the comparative analysis. Figure 2 illustrates these
properties.
Lemma 8 The upper bounds of the best-response functions of player i in each IP regime
are such that
xpi ≥ xci ≥ x
n,NE
i , (29)
for i = 1, 2,
And the lower bounds are such that
xp1 = x
n,NE
1 ≥ xc1, (30)
xn,NE2 = 0 < x
c
2 ≤ x
p
2 (31)
Besides,
xn,NE2 = 0 < x
c
2 < x
p
2 < x
c
2 < x
p
2 (32)
Finally,
xs,∗ = xp1 = x
p
1(0) (33)
Proof. The values of xli for i = 1, 2 and l = c, p, n have been computed in the proof
of lemmas 2 and 4 in the appendix and are given by:



xpi = ln v − ln 2αi + ln 2
xci = ln v − ln 2αi + ln(θ + 1)
xn,NE1 = ln v − ln 2
(34)
Clearly, with 0 < θ ≤ 1, we have:
ln v − ln 2αi + ln 2 > ln v − ln 2αi + ln(θ + 1) > ln v − ln 2 > 0
hence (29).
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We also have˙: 


xpi = ln v − ln 2αi
xci = ln v − ln 2αi + ln θ
xn,NE1 = ln v − ln 2
(35)
and because 0 < θ ≤ 1 :



ln v − ln 2 > ln v − ln 2 + ln θ
ln v − ln 2α > ln v − ln 2α+ ln θ
(36)
hence (30) and (31).
Besides, it is clear that:
ln v − ln 2α+ ln(θ + 1) > ln v − ln 2α (37)
Combining with (36) yields (32).
Finally,
xp1 = ln v − ln 2 + ln 2 = ln v = xs,∗
Assumption 1: v > 2α
θ
or equivalently: θ > 2α
v
.
This assumption enables us to draw the following illustrative graphic, with bxc2 > 0. It
is not fundamental for our analytical results.
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Figure 2: Upper and lower bounds of the best-response functions in each IP regime for
the static model
Proposition 1 The individual and aggregate R&D investments are always higher under
a patent regime than under a copyright regime or a regime with no protection.
Proof. We show that for all xpj = x
c
j = xj, x
p
i (xj) > x
c
i(xj) for i 6= j. But this is
obvious from the expression of the best-response functions given by (6), (7), (12) and
(13):
xpi (xj) > x
c
i(xj)
⇔ ln v − ln 2αi + ln(1 + e−xj) > ln v − ln 2αi + ln(θ + e−xj)
⇔ 1 > θ
which holds. And clearly xpi (xj) > x
c
i(xj) for i 6= j implies that xp,NEi > xc,NEi for
i = 1, 2.
Also,
xp1(x
p
2) > x
n,NE
1
always holds since the lower bounds of xp1(.) is equal to x
n,NE
1 from lemma 8.
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Proposition 2 The socially optimal R&D investment is always larger than the aggregate
investment provided by the firms in a regime without protection.
Proof. In the remaining of the paper,we denote X l the aggregate R&D investment
in IP regime l with l = c, p, n.
xs,∗ = ln v and Xn = xn,NE1 = ln v − ln 2.
Clearly ln v > ln v − ln 2
Proposition 3 The socially optimal R&D investment is always smaller than the aggre-
gate investment provided by the firms in a regime with patents.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Firts, note that e−xs,∗ = 1
v
.
1) Assume that the social optimum coincides with the aggregate equilibrium invest-
ment: xp1 + x
p
2 = x
s,∗.
Then, one can rewrite (12) as e−x
p
1 + e−x
p
1e−x
p
2 = 2
v
.
This implies that e−x
p
1 + e−x
s,∗
= 2
v
since by assumption xp1 + x
p
2 = x
s,∗.
Or, e−x
p
1 = 2
v
− 1
v
= 1
v
= e−x
s,∗
.
But e−x
p
1 = e−x
s,∗
would imply xp1 = x
s,∗. Again, by assumption xs,∗ = xp1 + x
p
2
Combining would yield: xp1 = x
p
1 + x
p
2
But we have shown that xp2 > 0,which contradicts the last equality.
Thus, xp1 + x
p
2 6= xs,∗
2) Assume that xp1 + x
p
2 < x
s,∗.
This would imply: e−x
p
1−x
p
2 > e−x
s,∗
= 1
v
.
But as long as xp2 > 0,one must have: x
p
1 < x
p
1 + x
p
2,
which implies: e−x
p
1 > e−x
p
1−x
p
2 > 1
v
.
We end up with two conditions:



e−x
p
1−x
p
2 > 1
v
e−x
p
1 > 1
v
(38)
Adding these two conditions yields: e−x
p
1 + e−x
p
1e−x
p
2 > 2
v
.
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But this contradicts the first-order condition (12).
Hence, xp1 + x
p
2 < x
s,∗ does not hold.
We can now conclude that xs,∗ < xp1 + x
p
2.
4 The Dynamic Model
Now, we consider the case where there is an infinite sequence of innovations, and each in-
novation ”builds” on the previous one: we assume that the development of the innovation
at date t+ 1 requires the right to use the innovation obtained at date t.
In the IP regime with patents, like in BM, a patent on the first innovation constrains
the set of firms able to perform R&D for the subsequent innovations: supposing that there
is no licensing, only the patentholder will have the right to perform R&D and eventually
realize the next innovations19.
As in the static model, we assume that a copyright regime allows for simultaneous
independent similar innovations: if both firms succeed, each earns the duopoly payoﬀ v
2
.
Again, if there is a winner and a looser, we assume the same payoﬀ functions as in the
static model: πw(θ) = 1
2
(1 + θ)v and πl(θ) = 1
2
(1− θ)v with 0 < θ ≤ 1.
Finally, in a regime without protection, whenever a firm is successful, it earns the
duopoly payoﬀ v
2
as well as its rival (the latter can imitate) and of course there are
always two firms involved in R&D at each period.
We assume that, at each period, v represents an incremental value. As stated in BM
(1999), ”an invention is simply an improvement that enhances the value of the first inno-
vation”. This allows us to avoid the complication associated with the replacement eﬀect.
Our model assumes a memoryless R&D process. Although simplifying, this assumption
is very common in the literature, for example in Poisson-process models of R&D20.
In the dynamic model, the equivalence property from the static analysis between a
copyright regime with θ = 1 and a patent regime does not hold anymore as will be seen.
19We assume licensing (and infringement) do not happen, to deal with the most extreme patent regime.
20See for example the seminal papers by Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1983) as
well as Reinganum (1989).
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Yet, this formal equivalence still holds between the copyright with θ = 0 and the regime
with no protection. Again, to guarantee interior solutions, we assume throughout that
v > 2α.
4.1 IP regime with patents
Denoting Uk,pi the objective function of firm i when there are k firms performing R&D (
k = 1 or k = 2 ) in a regime with patents, we have
U2,pi = −αibxpi + p(bxpi )½p(bxpj) ·12(v + U1,pi )
¸
+ (1− p(bxpj) £v + U1,pi ¤¾ (39)
with
U1,pi = −αiexi + p(exi) £v + U1,pi ¤ (40)
where the p superscript denotes the patent regime. bx denotes the R&D investment
when there are two players, that is only in the first period. Indeed, the winner of the first
period ( t = 0) obtains a patent that cannot be infringed upon and because a right on
the first innovation is a requirement for developing the next ones ( t = 1, 2...), the patent
holder is the only one able to perform R&D in the next periods. Therefore, ex denotes
the R&D investment of the winner of the first R&D game in periods t = 1, t = 2 etc...
In equation (39), the first term on the right-hand side is the cost of R&D. If player
i does not succeed she gets nothing (she cannot imitate). If she succeeds, they are two
possible outcomes captured by the term into brackets: either player j also succeeds in
which case, with probability 1
2
, player i gets the patent and is the only one able to perform
R&D in the next periods hence: v + U1,pi ,or player j fails and for sure player i gets the
patent and is the only one performing R&D in the next periods, hence v + U1,pi .
We look for the best response functions of each player for the first R&D game, bxpi (bxpj)
, and for an optimal investment in the subsequent R&D program by the winner of the
first patent, expi .
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Lemma 9 In an IP regime with patents, when innovations are cumulative, the equilib-
rium R&D investments in the first patent race are implicitely defined by the best response
functions:
bxp1 = v − 1− ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp2) (41)bxp2 = v − αα − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp1) (42)
and the eﬃcient firm invests strictly more than the ineﬃcient one. Moreover, the
investment of the winner of the first race in the subsequent R&Ds is given by:
ex1 = v − 1 (43)
ex2 = v − α
α
(44)
Proof. see the appendix.
The equilibrium R&D investments in all periods but the first one are thus given by
(43) and (44). Concerning the R&D investments in the first period, we can state the
following lemma:
Lemma 10 In an IP regime with patents, when innovations are cumulative, the non-
cooperative R&D game of the first period has a unique Nash equilibrium (bxp,NE1 ; bxp,NE2 ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.2 IP regime with copyrights
Denoting Uk,ci the objective function of firm i when there are k firms performing R&D
in a regime with copyrights, we have
U2,ci = −αibxci + p(bxci)np(bxcj) hv2 + U2,ci i+ (1− p(bxcj) £πw(θ) + U2,ci ¤o+
(1− p(bxci))p(bxcj) £πl(θ) + U2,ci ¤ (45)
23
where the superscript c stands for copyright, bx denotes the R&D investment when
there are two players and πl(θ) and πw(θ) are given by (1) and (2).
In this objective function, the first term, −αibxci , represents the cost of R&D for player
i, the second term represents the expected payoﬀ of player i if she succeeds in her R&D
program: with probability p(bxcj) the other player succeeds and in that case each player
earns the duopoly payoﬀ v
2
. Because both players have made the innovation they can of
course compete again in the next period, hence U2,ci ; with probability (1 − p(bxcj)) the
rival does not succeed and in that case the winner receives the payoﬀ πw(θ), but because
a copyright protects the work and not the underlying idea, the looser can still use the
idea not only to imitate but also to develop the next innovation and the game in the next
period will involve two players as well, hence U2,ci . Finally, the last term represents the
expected payoﬀ of player i if she looses the R&D race. For the same reason, because of
copyright protection, she is allowed to imitate, hence πl(θ), and she is still allowed to
perform R&D in the next period, provided the other player has found the innovation at
the previous period which happens with probability p(bxcj).
Again, we look for the best-response functions of each player: bxci(bxcj).
Lemma 11 In an IP regime with copyrights, when innovations are cumulative, the equi-
librium R&D investments in each period are implicitely defined by the best-response func-
tions:
bxc1 = −2 + v(1 + θe−bxc2)2 (46)bxc2 = −2α+ v(1 + θe−bxc1)2α (47)
Proof. See the appendix.
As for the previous cases analyzed, we cannot derive a closed-form solution for a Nash
equilibrium in R&D investment. Yet, we can state:
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Lemma 12 In an IP regime with copyrights, when innovations are cumulative, the non-
cooperative R&D game has an equilibrium in R&D investments (bxc,NE1 ; bxc,NE2 ) and this
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4.3 IP regime without protection
Denoting Uk,ni the objective function of player i when there are k players in such a regime,
we have
U2,ni = −αibxni + {1− (1− p(bxni ))(1− p(bxnj ))} hv2 + U2,ni i
The first term represents of cost of R&D for player i. The second term represents the
expected payoﬀ of player i in a regime without protection. The term {1− (1−p(bxni ))(1−
p(bxnj ))} is the probability that at least one player makes an innovation. Indeed, if two
players make an innovation they share the market and earn v
2
. If only one player makes
the innovation, they also share the market and earn v
2
because the looser can freely
imitate the innovation (we assume it is done immediately and at no cost). In any case,
when at least an innovation is made at period t , both players can use it to perform,
R&D in the next period, hence U2,ni .
It is clear that U2,ni = U
2,c
i (θ) with θ = 0. As for the static model, the intuition
for this equivalence is straightforward: If there is no protection, the looser of an R&D
race can legally imitate the invention so that each firms gets v
2
, but this is precisely the
payoﬀ obtained from πw(0) and πl(θ). Moreover, the looser will still be in the race in the
subsequent periods.
We can use this equivalence property to derive the best-response functions of each
player from the ones obtained in the copyright case21.
21Alternatively, one could have solved the program of player i in this regime: Maxbxni U
2,n
i and obtained
the best-response functions (48) and (49).
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Lemma 13 In an IP regime without protection, when innovations are cumulative, the
equilibrium R&D investments in each period are
bxn1 = v − 22 (48)bxn2 = v − 2α2α (49)
Proof. Substitute θ = 0 in (46) and (47).
4.4 The Socially optimal R&D investment
From the society’s point of view, what matters is that at least one firms makes the
innovation so that society gets v. Denotingt Us the objective function of the social planner
in the dynamic case:
Us = −
2X
i=1
αibxsi + [1− (1− p(bxs1))(1− p(bxs2))][v + Us] (50)
The objective of the social planner is
Maxbxs1,bxs2 Us (51)
Lemma 14 The social surplus is maximized when the most eﬃcient firm invests a pos-
itive amount in R&D: bxs,∗ = bxs1 = v − 1 (52)
Proof. Solving the program (51) yields the two first-order conditions:
bxs1 = v − 1− αbxs2 (53)bxs2 = v − α− bxs1α (54)
These two conditions cannot hold together. It must be that in equilibrium, bxsi > 0
and bxsj = 0 for i 6= j.If bxs2 = 0 then bxs1 = v − 1 and substituting for these values in Us
yields:
U1s = e
v−1 − v (55)
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If bxs1 = 0 then bxs2 = v−αα and:
U2s = αe
v−α
α − v (56)
We must show that Φ(α) = U1s − U2s = ev − αe
v
α > 0 for all α > 1
First:
lim
α7→1+
Φ(α) = 0 (57)
Second, remembering that the condition for interior solutions is v > 2α,we have:
∂Φ(α)
∂α
= e
v
α (
v
α
− 1) > 0 (58)
Hence, taking (57) into account, we can conclude that U1s > U
2
s .
4.5 Comparison of the three IP regimes
As for the static case, we cannot derive a comparative analysis from the equilibrium R&D
investments. However, we can use the results on the best-response functions. First, we
state a useful lemma concerning the upper and lower bounds of these functions.
Lemma 15 The upper and lower bounds of the best-response functions of player i in
each IP regime are such that: 


bxpi ≥ bxcibxn,NEi = bxcibxpi > bxci
(59)
for i = 1, 2.
Proof. The values of bxli and bxli for i = 1, 2 and l = p, c, n have been computed in the
proof of lemmas 10 and 12 in the appendix and are given by:



bxpi = v−αiαibxpi = v−αiαi − ln 2 (60)
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


bxci = −2αi+v(1+θ)2αibxci = −2αi+v2αi (61)
Finally, bxn,NEi is given by (48) and (49).
Thus, the necessary condition for bxpi ≥ bxci is that v(1− θ) ≥ 0 which is satisfied since
θ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, a simple comparison shows that bxn,NEi = bxci .
And the necessary condition for bxpi > bxci is that 1 > ln 2, which holds.
The following graphic illustrates lemma 15:
 1ˆx
2xˆ  
px 1ˆ  
cn xx 11 ˆˆ =  
cn xx 22 ˆˆ = px 2ˆ
cp xx 22 ˆˆ =
cp xx 11 ˆˆ =  
Figure 3: Reaction curves in each IP regimes when innovations are cumulative
Proposition 4 (individual per-period investments). The individual per-period R&D
investment is always larger under a patent regime than without protection.
Proof. Under a patent regime, from period 2 on, the individual per-period R&D
investments are ex1 = v− 1 if firm 1 obtained the patent and ex2 = v−αα if firm 2 obtained
the patent. With no protection, bxn1 = v−22 < v− 1 and bxn2 = v−2α2α < v−αα . Concerning the
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first period, since bxpi = v−αiαi − ln 2,it follows that bxpi > bxni if bxni < bxpi . This holds provided
that:
v − αi
αi
− ln 2 > v − 2αi
2αi
⇔ v > αi ln 2 (62)
But by assumption v > 2α. So it must be that (62) is satisfied.
The comparative analysis between the IP regimes in terms of aggregate investments
yields a first set of results summarized by proposition 5:
Proposition 5 ( Aggregate R&D investments)
i) The aggregate R&D investment is strictly higher in a regime with patents than in
a regime with no protection if the eﬃcient firm obtains the patent in the first period.
ii) If the firms are symmetric (α = 1), the aggregate R&D investment is always strictly
higher in a regime with patents than in a regime with no protection, regardless which firm
obtained the patent in the first period.
iii) Moreover, the aggregate R&D investment is strictly higher under a copyright
regime than without protection.
Proof. In what follows, by a slight abuse of notation, we denote bxl,NEi (for l = p, c, n)
by bxli.
i) If the eﬃcient firm has obtained the patent in the first period, we compute the
expected aggregate investment in the subsequent periods:
eX1 = ©ex1 + (1− e−ex1)ex1 + (1− e−ex1)2ex1 + ...ª (63)
which is equivalent to: eX1 = ex1eex1 (64)
Equivalently, in the non-protection case where there are always two firms performing
R&D, the expected aggregate investment from period 2 on is:
bXn = (bxn1 + bxn2)e(bxn1+bxn2 ) (65)
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We can compute, from lemmas 9 and 13:



a = ex1 = v − 1
b = bxn,NE1 + bxn,NE2 = v−22 + v−2α2α (66)
Inequality a > b holds provided that v−2
2
+ v−2α
2α
< v − 1.
This is true if:
v(1− α)− 2α < 0 (67)
which always holds since α > 1.
We can write bXn = beb and eX = aea Since a > b, and ∂ bXn
∂k
> 0 for k = a, b,it follows
that: eX > bXn
ii) If firms are symmetric, then, from lemma 13:
bXn = ·2× v − 2
2
¸
e2(
v−2
2
) = (v − 2)ev−2 (68)
And the R&D investment in all periods but the first one is given by lemma 9,
eX = exieexi(1− e−exi) = (v − 1)ev−1 (69)
for i = 1, 2. Since v − 1 > v − 2,it follows that eX > bXn.
iii) The expected aggregate investment under copyright is given by:



bXc = ses(1− e−s)
s = bxc1 + bxc2 (70)
and we have computed above bXn = beb(1− e−b) with b given by (66)
We cannot compute s explicitely, but we can still show that s > b.Indeed, adding the
two best-response functions from lemma 11:
s =
−4α+ v(1 + α) + vθ(αe−bxc2 + e−bxc1)
2α
(71)
But since 0 < αe−bxc2 ≤ α and 0 < e−bxc1 ≤ 1, it follows that 0 < vθ(αe−bxc2 + e−bxc1) ≤
(α+ 1)vθ. And consequently:
v(1 + α)− 4α
2α
< s ≤ v(1 + α)− 4α+ (1 + α)vθ
2α
(72)
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Call s the lower bound of this inequality. We can show that b ≤ s. Indeed:
v(1 + α)− 4α
2α
≤ v(1 + α)− 4α
2α
(73)
which holds. We thus have b ≤ s < s. From which we can conclude that bXc > bXn.
Moreover, we can draw two important conclusions concerning the socially optimal
expected aggregate investment:
Proposition 6 (Social Optimum)
i) The expected aggregate R&D investment in a regime with no protection is always
less than the socially optimal investment.
ii) The socially optimal R&D investment is less than the expected aggregate R&D
investment in a patent regime if the firms are symmetric.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 i) and iii) and proposition 6 contradict BM’s claim that there are
circumstances where a regime with no protection leads to more R&D investments than
a regime with patents and that this might be socially optimal.
5 Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to show that Bessen and Maskin’s model of
cumulative innovations is not robust when the success probability of an R&D program is
endogenized. We reached the conclusion that even if a patent regime can restrict the set
of firms authorized to perform R&D, the aggregate R&D investment is still higher in this
regime than in a regime with no protection. This suggests that the static disincentives
associated with the absence of protection are stronger than the dynamic benefits resulting
from this regime. Moreover, a regime with no intellectual property protection always
yields an expected aggregate R&D investment less than the socially optimal one.
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Our paper also introduced a stylized model of IP rights where three regimes coexist.
In particular, we introduced the copyright regime as a regime with three distinctive
features: a lower scope than the patent regime, the impossibility to exclude the ”looser”
of an R&D race from future research (since the ”idea” of an invention is not protected
under copyright), and a right for independent simultaneous identical inventions.
Yet, since we followed the assumptions of the original model proposed by Bessen
and Maskin (the only modification concerning the probability of success), we could not
elaborate more on the IP regimes. Our model still suggests several possibilities for further
research in the analysis of copyright as a distinct form of protection and in the welfare
comparison of diﬀerent IP regimes.
Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 2 : The proof proceeds in two steps: first, we show that the best-
response functions of each player have an upper-bound and a lower bound denoted xci
and xci ; then we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments.
1) The best-response function of player i is given by
xci(x
c
j) = ln v − ln 2αi + ln(θ + e−x
c
j) (A1)
for i 6= j . Note first that xci and xcj are strategic substitutes since ∂xi(x
c
j)
∂xcj
= −e
−xcj
θ+e
−xc
j
< 0
and thus the upper bound of xci is reached for x
c
j = 0 whereas the lower bound is given
by the constant asymptot defined by lim
xcj 7→+∞
xci(x
c
j).We have:
xci(0) = x
c
i = ln v − ln 2αi + ln(1 + θ) (A2)
lim
xcj 7→+∞
xci(x
c
j) = x
c
i = ln v − ln 2αi + ln θ (A3)
Or, substituting α1 = 1 and α2 = α in (A2) and (A3),


xc1 = ln v − ln 2 + ln(1 + θ)
xc1 = ln v − ln 2 + ln θ
(A4)



xc2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(1 + θ)
xc2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln θ
(A5)
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2) Now consider the system of best-response functions defined by (6) and (7):
xc1(x
c
2) = ln v − ln 2 + ln(θ + e−x
c
2)
xc2(x
c
1) = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(θ + e−x
c
1)
Denote xc1(x
c
2)
def
= g(xc2). From x
c
2(x
c
1) one can derive:
xc2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(θ + e−x
c
1)
⇔ xc1 = − ln
£
ex
c
2−ln v+ln 2α − θ
¤ def
= f(xc2) (A6)
The equilibrium xc2,denoted x
c,NE
2 solves the following equation:
f(xc2) = g(x
c
2) (A7)
We cannot derive a closed-form solution for xc,NE2 . However, we can show that an
equilibrium value exists and is unique. To show that, we consider the functions f(.) and
g(.) on the interval (xc2, x
c
2) (because g(.) is defined only on this interval). We first show
that the following inequalities hold: g(xc2) < lim
xc2 7→xc2
f(xc2) and g(x
c
2) > f(x
c
2) (existence).
Then we show that both functions are strictly decreasing on this interval with
¯¯¯
∂f(xc2)
∂xc2
¯¯¯
larger than
¯¯¯
∂g(xc2)
∂xc2
¯¯¯
(uniqueness).
We have:
lim
xc2 7→xc2
f(xc2) = − lim
xc2 7→xc2
ln
£
ex
c
2−ln v+ln 2α − θ
¤
= − lim
Z 7→0
lnZ = +∞,
whereas g(xc2) = ln v − ln 2 + ln(θ + e− ln v+ln 2α−ln(1+θ)) = ζc with ζc being a
positive finite number. It follows that:
g(xc2) < lim
xc2 7→xc2
f(xc2). (A8)
Finally, f(xc2) = − ln
£
eln v−ln 2α+ln(1+θ)−ln v+ln 2α − θ
¤
= 0 and g(xc2) = x
c
1(x
c
2) > x
c
1
since xc1 is the lower bound of g(.) . And by assumption, we have x
c
1 > 0, from which we
conclude that
f(xc2) < g(x
c
2). (A9)
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Thus an equilibrium exists.
Simple computations yields:
∂f(xc2)
∂xc2
= − e
xc2−ln v+ln 2α
ex
c
2−ln v+ln 2α − θ < 0 (A10)
∂g(xc2)
∂xc2
=
−e−xc2
θ + e−x
c
2
< 0 (A11)
The sign of (A10) comes from the fact that ex
c
2−ln v+ln 2α − θ > 0 ⇔ xc2 > ln v −
ln 2α+ ln θ = xc2 which holds here because we consider the interval (x
c
2, x
c
2].
To compare the slopes, note that¯¯¯¯
∂f(xc2)
∂xc2
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∂g(xc2)
∂xc2
¯¯¯¯
⇔ −e−xc2 < exc2−ln v+ln 2α,
which always holds.
Thus the equilibrium is unique.
3) There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments, ( xc,NE1 , x
c,NE
2 )
where xc,NE2 solves f(x
c
2) = g(x
c
2) and x
c,NE
1 = g(x
c.NE
2 ) = f(x
c,NE
2 ). Moreover, it is clear
that xc,NE1 ∈ (xc1, xc2] and x
c,NE
2 ∈ (xc2, xc2]. QED.
Here, we provide a graphical illustration of the unique equilibrium that we proved
above.
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Figure 4: Nash equilibrium of the R&D game under a copyright regime, assuming
θ > 2α
v
.
Proof of Lemma 4 : As for the proof of lemma 2, this proof proceeds in two steps:
first, we show that the best-response functions of each player have a upper bound and a
lower bound denoted xpi and x
p
i for i = 1, 2 ; then we show that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in R&D investments. Yet, we can use the equivalence property emphasized
in subsection 3.2 to shorten the first step of the proof.
1) Substituting θ = 1 in (A2) and (A3 ) yields the expressions for the upper and the
lower bounds xpi and x
p
i :
xpi = ln v − ln 2αi + ln 2 (A12)
xpi = ln v − ln 2αi (A13)
And substituting α1 = 1 and α2 = α > 1 in (A12) and (A13):



xp1 = ln v
xp1 = ln v − ln 2
(A14)



xp2 = ln v − lnα
xp2 = ln v − ln 2α
(A15)
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2) Now consider the system of best-response functions as defined by (11) and (12):
xp1(x
p
2) = ln v − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−x
p
2)
xp2(x
p
1) = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(1 + e−x
p
1)
Denote xp1(x
p
2)
def
= g(xp2). From x
p
2(x
p
1) one can derive:
xp2 = ln v − ln 2α+ ln(1 + e−x
p
1)
⇔ xp1 = − ln
h
ex
p
2−ln v−ln 2α − 1
i
def
= f(xp2) (A16)
(11) and (A16) imply that the equilibrium value of xp2, denoted x
p,NE
2 , solve the
following equation:
f(xp2) = g(x
p
2) (A17)
As in the proof of lemma 2 for the copyright regime, we cannot derive a closed-form
solution for xp,NE2 . However, we can show that an equilibrium value exists and is unique.
To show that, we consider the functions f(.) and g(.) on the interval (xp2, x
p
2] (because g(.)
is only defined on this interval). We first show that both functions are strictly decreasing
on this interval with
¯¯¯
∂f(xp2)
∂xp2
¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯
∂g(xp2)
∂xp2
¯¯¯
,and then that the following inequalities hold:
g(xp2) < lim
xp2 7→xp2
f(xp2) and g(x
p
2) > f(x
p
2).
Simple computations yields:
∂f(xp2)
∂xp2
= − e
xp2−ln v+ln 2α
ex
p
2−ln v+ln 2α − 1
< 0 (A18)
∂g(xp2)
∂xp2
=
−e−xp2
1 + e−x
p
2
< 0 (A19)
The negative sign in (A18) comes from the fact that ex
p
2−ln v+ln 2α−1 > 0⇔ xp2 >
ln v − ln 2α=xp2 which is assumed here since we consider the interval (x
p
2, x
p
2].
It is clear that ¯¯¯¯
∂f(xp2)
∂xp2
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∂g(xp2)
∂xp2
¯¯¯¯
⇔ −e−x
p
2 < ex
p
2−ln v+ln2α
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which always holds.
Then, lim
xp2 7→xp2
f(xp2) = − lim
xp2 7→xp2
ln
£
ex
p
2−ln v+ln 2α − 1
¤
= − lim
Z 7→0
lnZ = +∞,
whereas g(xp2) = ln v − ln 2 + ln(1 + e− ln v+ln 2α) = ζp with ζp being a positive
finite number. It follows that:
g(xp2) < lim
xp2 7→xp2
f(xp2) (A20)
Finally, f(xp2) = − ln
£
eln v−lnα−ln v−ln 2α − 1
¤
= 0 whereas g(xp2) = x
p
1(x
p
2) > x
p
1
since xp1 is the lower bound of g(.).By assumption, we have x
p
1 > 0 so we can conclude
that
f(xp2) < g(x
P
2 ). (A21)
3) We have shown that f(.) and g(.) are strictly decreasing on (xp2, x
p
2] with
lim
xp2 7→xp2
f(xp2) > g(x
p
2) and f(x
p
2) > g(x
p
2).From that, it follows that there exists a unique
intersection between f(.) and g(.) on (xp2, x
p
2] such that f(x
p
2) = g(x
p
2).Consequently, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments, (xp,NE1 ;x
p;NE
2 ) where x
p,NE
2 solves
f(xp2) = g(x
p
2) and x
p,NE
1 = g(x
p,NE
2 ) = f(x
p,NE
2 ).Moreover, it is clear that x
p,NE
1 ∈ (x
p
1, x
p
1]
and xp,NE2 ∈ (x
p
2, x
p
2). QED.
Proof of lemma 9. Consider equation (32) first. Solving for U1,pi , we obtain:
U1,pi =
−αiexi + (1− e−exi)v
e−exi (A22)
from this expression we obtain
v + U1,pi =
v − αiexi
e−exi (A23)
and substituting for v+U1,pi into equation (31) yields the following objective function
for player i
U2,pi = −αibxpi + (1− e−bxpi )½(1− e−bxpj )v − αiexi2e−exi + e−bxpj v − αiexie−exi
¾
(A24)
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which simplifies to
U2,pi = −αibxpi + 1 + e−bxpj2e−exi (1− e−bxpi )(v − αiexi) (A25)
We now solve for a Nash equilibrium in bxpi , i = 1, 2, given exi. To determine exi we
compute the first-order condition associated with the optimization program of the winner
of the first patent with respect to the R&D investment levels for the next researches. That
is
Maxexi U1,pi
where U1,pi is given by (A22).
The first-order condition is exi = v − αi
αi
(A26)
Given our assumptions about the asymmetry between the two firms (firm 1 being
more eﬃcient than firm 2 in performing R&D), we can replace αi by 1 for firm 1 and by
α for firm 2 (with α > 1).We thus obtain the optimal investment of the winner of the
first race in the subsequent R&Ds
ex1 = v − 1 (A27)
ex2 = v − α
α
(A28)
Now, given exi we consider the optimization program of the two players before the
race for the first patent starts. That is
Maxbxi U2,pi
where U2,pi is given by (A25).
The first order condition associated with this program defines the best response func-
tions of each firm
e−bxpi = αi2e−exi
(1 + e−bxpj )(v − αiexi) (A29)
38
Again, we can replace αi by 1 for firm 1 and by α for firm 2. Also, we susbstitute exi
for its optimal value obtained in (A27) and (A28).
e−bxp1 = 2e1−v
1 + e−bxp2 (A30)
e−bxp2 = 2e−
v−α
α
1 + e−bxp1 (A31)
which can be re-expressed as
bxp1 = v − 1− ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp2) (A32)bxp2 = v − αα − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp1) (A33)
(A30) and (A31) can be written:
e−bxp1(1 + e−bxp2) = 2e1−v
e−bxp2(1 + e−bxp1) = 2e− v−αα
Substracting these two equalities yields e−bxp1−e−bxp2 = 2(e1−v−eα−vα ) which is negative
since v − 1 > v−α
α
=⇒ e1−v < eα−vα for all α > 1.
We can conclude that bxp1 > bxp2.
QED.
Proof of lemma 10 : Again, the proof proceeds in two steps: we start by computing
the upper and lower bounds of the best-response functions given by (33) and (34). Then,
we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in R&D investments.
1) The best-response function of player i is given by:
bxpi (bxpj) = v − αiαi − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxpj ) (A34)
for i 6= j. Note that bxpi and bxpj are strategic substitutes since ∂bxpi (bxpj )∂bxpj = −ebxpj1+e−bxpj < 0 and
the upper bound of bxpi (.) is reached for bxpj = 0 whereas the lower bound is given by the
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constant asymptot defined by limbxpj 7→+∞bxpi (bxpj). We have:
bxpi = bxpi (0) = v − αiαi (A35)bxpi = limbxpj 7→+∞bxpi (bxpj) = v − αiαi − ln 2 (A36)
Or, substituting α1 = 1 and α2 = α > 1 in (A35) and (A36),


bxp1 = v − 1bxp1 = v − 1− ln 2 (A37)


bxp2 = v−ααbxp2 = v−αα − ln 2 (A38)
2) Now consider the system of best-response functions formed by (33) and (34):
bxp1(bxp2) = v − 1− ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp2) (A39)bxp2(bxp1) = v − αα − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp1) (A40)
Denote bxp1(bxp2) def= g(bxp2) and from bxp2(bxp1) we can derive:
bxc2 = v − αα − ln 2 + ln(1 + e−bxp1)
⇔ bxp1 = − ln hebxp2+1+ln 2− vα − 1i def= f(bxp2) (A41)
(33) and (A41) imply that the equilibrium value of bxp2, denoted bxp,NE2 solve the fol-
lowing equation:
f(bxp2) = g(bxp2) (A42)
We can show that an equilibrium value exists and is unique. To show that, we consider
the functions f(.) and g(.) on the interval ( bxp2, bxp2] (because g(.) is defined only on this
interval). We first show that both functions are strictly decreasing on this interval with¯¯¯
∂f(bxp2)
∂bxp2
¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯
∂g(bxp2)
∂bxp2
¯¯¯
and then that the following inequalities hold: g(bxp2) < limbxp2 7→bxp2f(bxp2) and
g(bxp2) > f(bxp2).
simple computations yield:
∂f(bxp2)
∂bxp2 = − e
bxp2+1+ln 2− v2
ebxp2+1+ln 2−v2 − 1 < 0 (A43)
∂g(bxp2)
∂bxp2 = −e
−bxp2
1 + e−bxp2 < 0 (A44)
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The sign of (A43) comes from the fact that ebxp2+1+ln 2− vα−1 > 0⇔ bxp2 > v−αα −ln 2 = bxp2
which holds here because we consider the interval ( bxp2, bxp2].
It is clear that: ¯¯¯¯
∂f(bxp2)
∂bxp2
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∂g(bxp2)
∂bxp2
¯¯¯¯
⇐⇒ −e−bxp2 < ebxp2+1+ln 2− vα
which always holds.
Then, limbxp2 7→bxp2f(bxp2) = − limbxp2 7→bxp2 ln £ebxp2+1+ln v− vα − 1¤ = − limZ 7→0 lnZ = +∞
whereas g(bxp2) = v − 1− ln 2 + ln h1 + e− v−αα +ln 2i = bζp with bζp being a positive finite
number. It follows that:
g(bxp2) < limbxp2 7→bxp2f(bxp2). (A45)
Finally, f(bxp2) = − ln he v−αα +1+ln 2− vα − 1i = 0 and g(bxp2) = bxp1(bxp2) > bxp1 since bxp1 is the
lower bound of g(.). And by assumption we have bxp1 > 0. we can thus conclude that
f(bxp2) < g(bxp2). (A46)
3)We have shown that f(.) and g(.) are strictly decreasing on (bxp2, bxp2]with limbxp2 7→bxp2f(bxp2) >
g(bxp2) and f(bxp2) < g(bxp2). From that it follows that there exists a unique intersection be-
tween f(.) and g(.) on (bxp2, bxp2] such that f(bxp2 = g(bxp2).Consequently, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium in R&D investments, (bxp,NE1 , bxp,NE2 ) where bxp,NE2 solves f(bxp2) = g(bxp2)
and bxp,NE1 = f(bxp,NE2 ) = g(bxp,NE2 ). Moreover, it is clear that bxp,NE1 ∈ (bxp1, bxp1] andbxp,NE2 ∈ (bxp2, bxp2). QED.
Proof of lemma 11: Consider the objective function of player i given by (37). Substi-
tuting for p(bxi) and p(bxj) and solving for U2,ci , it can be rewritten as:
U2,ci =
1
e−bxci e−bxcj
h
−αibxi + v
2
+
v
2
θe−bxcj − v
2
θe−bxci − v
2
e−bxci e−bxcji (A47)
The objective of player i is defined as:
Maxbxi U2,ci
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The first-order condition associated with this problem is:
bxci = −2αi + v(1 + θe−bxcj)2αi (A48)
Again, plugging in α1 = 1 and α2 = α > 1 into (A48), we obtain the best-response
functions bxc1(bxc2) and bxc2(bxc1). QED.
Proof of lemma 12 : We proceed as for the proof of lemmas 2,4 and 10 in deriving
the upper and lower bounds. The proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium requires nevertheless another approach.
1) The best response function of player i is given by:
bxci = −2αi + v(1 + θe−bxcj)2αi (A49)
for i 6= j. bxci and bxcj are strategic substitutes since ∂bxci (bxcj)∂bxcj = − θv2αi e−bxcj < 0 and thus the
upper bound of bxci is reached for bxcj = 0 whereas the lower bound is given limbxcj 7→+∞ bxci(bxcj).
We have:
bxci(0) = bxci = −2αi + v(1 + θ)2αi (A50)
limbxcj 7→+∞bxci(bxcj) = bxci = −2αi + v2αi (A51)
Substituting for α1 = 1 and α2 = α > 1 in (A50) and (A51):



bxc1 = −2+v(1+θ)2bxc1 = −2+v2 (A52)


bxc2 = −2α+v(1+θ)2αbxc2 = −2α+v2α (A53)
2) Now, considering the system of best-response functions defined by (38) and (39).
Let us denote f(bxc2) def= bxc1 and g(bxc1) def= bxc2 :
bxc1(bxc2) = −2 + v(1 + θe−bxc2)2 def= f(bxc2)bxc2(bxc1) = −2α+ v(1 + θe−bxc1)2α def= g(bxc1)
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Clearly,
f(bxc2) + 1 = v(1 + θe−bxc2)2
g(bxc1) + 1 = v(1 + θe−bxc1)2α
Denoting y1 = bxc1 + 1 = f(bxc2) + 1 and y2 = bxc2 + 1 = g(bxc1) + 1,
y1 =
v(1 + θe−(y2−1))
2
def
= φ(y2) (A54)
y2 =
v(1 + θe−(y1−1))
2α
(A55)
Inverting (A55) yields:
y1 = 1− ln[
2αy2 − v
θ
]
def
= µ(y2) (A56)
µ(.) is defined only on [ v
2α
,+∞). To show the existence of an equilibrium, we compute:



φ( v
2α
) = v(1+θe
−( v2α−1))
2
lim
y2 7→ v2α
µ(y2) = +∞
(A57)
And 


lim
y2 7→+∞
φ(y2) =
v
2
lim
y2 7→+∞
µ(y2) = −∞
(A58)
Thus an equilibrium exists.
To show the uniqueness, we prove that:¯¯¯¯
∂µ(y2)
∂y2
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∂φ(y2)
∂y2
¯¯¯¯
(A59)
at the equilibrium point.
We have: 


¯¯¯
∂µ(y2)
∂y2
¯¯¯
= 2α
2αy2−v¯¯¯
∂φ(y2)
∂y2
¯¯¯
= vθ
2
e−(y2−1)
(A60)
The equilibrium condition is given by (A54) and (A56):
vθe−(y2−1))
2
= 1− v
2
− ln(2αy2 − v
θ
) (A61)
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Inserting into (A59) yields:
2α
2αy2 − v
> 1− v
2
− ln[2αy2 − v
θ
] (A62)
Since we have the general result: ln x ≥ 1− x−1, the last inequality holds for certain
if:
2α
2αy2 − v
> 1− v
2
− (1− θ
2αy2 − v
)
⇐⇒ 2α
2αy2 − v
> −v
2
+
θ
2αy2 − v
(A63)
This holds if:
2α− θ
2αy2 − v
> −v
2
(A64)
But, given that α > 1,



θ ∈ [0, 1] =⇒ 2α− θ > 0
y2 >
v
2α
=⇒ 2αy2 − v > 0
Hence (A64 ) holds.
We can conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium value for y2 and thus a unique
equilibrium value for y1. Then, since bxc1 = y1 − 1 and bxc2 = y2 − 1, there exists as well a
unique equilibrium value for bxc1and bxc2 denoted bxc,NE1 and bxc,NE2 . QED.
Proof of Proposition 6:
i) The expected aggregate investment in a regime with no protection has been com-
puted in the proof of proposition 4 i):



bXn = beb(1− e−b)
b = v(α+1)−4α
2α
(A65)
and the socially optimal expected investment comes from lemma 14. Since bxs,∗ = v − 1,
we have: 


bXs,∗ = rer(1− e−r)
r = bxs,∗ = v − 1 (A66)
But r > b implies that bXn < bXs,∗.
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ii) The expected aggregate investment in a patent regime from period 1 on is:



bIp = bxp1 + bxp2 + (1− e−bxp1)e−bxp2Ω1 + (1− e−bxp2)e−bxp1Ω2
+(1− e−bxp1)(1− e−bxp2) £1
2
Ω1 + 12Ω2
¤
.
Ω1 = ex1eex1
Ω2 = exp2eexp2
(A67)
whereas the socially optimal expected investment is given by bXs,∗.
We can rewrite (A67) as follows:
bIp = bxp1+bxp2+12(1−e−bxp1+e−bxp2−e−bxp1−bxp2)ex1eex1+12(1−e−bxp2+e−bxp1−e−bxp1−bxp2)ex2eex2 (A68)
We now evaluate how this expected aggregate investment evolves when the degree of
asymmetry α between the firms increases, from the situation where the firms are sym-
metric (α = 1) : dbIp
dα
|α=1. . We use the implicit function theorem to express dbxpidα for
i = 1, 2.
Given the best-response functions in lemma 9, we have:



F (bxp1, bxp2;α) = bxp1 − v + 1 + ln 2− ln(1 + e−bxp2) = 0
G(bxp1, bxp2;α) = bxp2 − v−αα + ln 2− ln(1 + e−bxp1) = 0 (A69)
We compute the following derivatives:



F1 =
∂F (.)
∂bxp1 = 1; F2 = ∂F (.)∂bxp2 = 11+e−bxp2 e−bx
p
2 ; F3 =
∂F (.)
∂α
= 0
G1 =
∂G(.)
∂bxp1 = 11+e−bxp1 e−bx
p
1 ; G2 = 1; G3 =
v
α2
(A70)
Now, we determine the following Jacobians:



J =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ F1 F2
G1 G2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = 1− e−bxp1−bxp2(1+e−bxp1 )(1+e−bxp2 ) 6= 0
J1 =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ −F3 F2−G3 G2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = vα2 e−bxp21+e−bxp2
J2 =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ F1 −F3
G1 −G3
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ = − vα2
(A71)
From which it follows that:


dbxp1
dα
=
v
α2
e−bxp2 (1+e−bxp1 )
1+e−bxp2+e−bxp1 > 0
dbxp2
dα
= −
v
α2
(1+e−bxp1 )(1+e−bxp2 )
1+e−bxp1+e−bxp2 < 0
(A72)
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Moreover, it is easy to see from lemma 9 that dex1
dα
= 0 and dex2
dα
= − v
α2
Given (A68):
dbIp
dα
=
dbxp1
dα
·
1 +
1
2
e−bxp1ex1eex1 + 1
2
e−ex1−ex2ex1eex1 − 1
2
e−ex1ex2eex2 + 1
2
e−bxp1−bxp2ex2eex2¸+(A73)
dbx2
dα
·
1− 1
2
e−bxp2ex1eex1 + 1
2
e−bxp1−bxp2ex1eex1 + 1
2
e−bxp2ex2eex2 + 1
2
e−bxp1−bxp2ex2eex2¸−
v
α2
(eex2 + ex2eex2)1
2
(1− e−bxp2 + e−bxp1 − e−bxp1−bxp2)
Noting that, at α = 1, we have ex1 = ex2 = ex = v − 1, and bxp1 = bxp2 = bx :
dbIp
dα
|α=1 = dbxp1
dα
(1 + e−2bxexeex) + dbxp2
dα
(1 + e−2bxexeex)
−v(eex´ + exeex)1
2
(1− e−2bx) (A74)
Hence:
dbIp
dα
< 0
Thus, from the point where the firms are symmetric (α = 1), when the degree of
asymmetry increases, the expected aggregate investment decreases. Since the investment
of the eﬃcient firm is maximal and equal to the social optimum v−1 when the investment
of the ineﬃcient one is 0,and since the investment of the ineﬃcient firm is 0 for a high
enough α ( v fixed), it follows that for the smallest α (α = 1), the expected aggregate
investment is higher than the socially optimal investment.
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